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A Constructivist’s Journey: From PCP to Social Constructionism- and back? 
EPCA conference, Queen Mary University of London 
 
Vivien Burr 
University of Huddersfield, UK 
July 2008 
 
In this presentation I want to comment on what I see as the location of Personal 
Construct Psychology within the field of psychology more generally, and 
particularly in relation to the theoretical perspective that has come to be known 
as social constructionism. But it is also an account and a history of my own 
intellectual journey over a period of nearly 20 years. The reason why I have 
decided to present my thoughts in this narrative way is that I do not hold with the 
hard science view that the academic and personal are separate realms. One’s 
intellectual sympathies are very personal, and are intimately connected to one’s 
experience, biography and at a superordinate level one’s values and beliefs. This 
presentation, then, is just one person’s construction. 
 
My long association with Personal Construct Psychology (PCP) began, like so 
many things that are lasting in our lives, with something of great personal 
relevance to me. I have just finished writing a chapter for Richard Butler’s new 
book “On Reflection: Emphasizing the Personal in Construct Theory” where I 
reflect in some detail about this, but I will just say enough about it here to give 
you an idea of what started it all off. 
 
Back in 1983, when I was offered the modest position of temporary part time 
lecturer at what was then Huddersfield Polytechnic I was utterly terrified. I 
remember driving home from the interview, my mind dangerously pre-occupied 
with the knowledge that in a very short while I would be teaching 
undergraduates. Suddenly, it didn’t seem all that long ago that I was an 
undergraduate myself. 
 
By obsessively over-preparing for every lecture, I somehow got through the year 
but I was plagued by the thought that my colleagues would see that I was not a 
‘real’ teacher’, and that the students would uncover my ‘true’ identity as a wife 
and mother posing as a university teacher. In my mind, I continued to just ‘get 
away with’ being an impostor- but the appalling revelation seemed just around 
the next corner. I put myself on a treadmill, engaging in more and more anxious 
preparation each time, always fearing that the next lecture would be the one 
where I would be unmasked. 
 
It seems obvious to me now that the real problem was not about becoming more 
knowledgeable or proficient. It was about bridging the gap between my self-
construal and what I thought of as ‘a lecturer’. However, at that time I was not 
able to represent the problem to myself in these terms. 
 
It was at this time that I first became acquainted with Trevor Butt, who was then 
teaching at Huddersfield and subsequently became a longstanding and most 
trusted friend. Trevor had at the time been in regular practice as a 
psychotherapist with an intellectual home in PCP. His role as a psychotherapist 
probably gave me the confidence to reveal my insecurities to him, and he 
listened sympathetically and encouraged me to reflect on my experience with 
some good questions. What, he asked, was my ‘evidence’ for my assertion that I 
wasn’t a proper lecturer or an effective teacher? What was the worst thing that I 
imagined could happen, my ‘nightmare scenario’? Trevor then insisted that I tell 
him of events that could be seen as evidence that I was in fact a good teacher, 
for example comments from students and other staff. It all sounds so obvious 
now, but at the time it really was a change of perspective for me that I had not 
been able to begin for myself. Like most people embarking on a process of fairly 
radical personal change, I believe I probably also exhibited some of what George 
Kelly meant by ‘hostility’, for a while stubbornly holding on to my construal of 
myself and my belief in my personal failings and refusing to acknowledge 
counter-evidence because, again like most of us at least some of the time, I 
preferred to be right rather than happy. As Trevor Butt puts it in his engaging new 
book on George Kelly (Butt, 2008), hostility is insisting that we are right when we 
sense we are wrong. In PCP terms, I was pursuing a strategy of definition rather 
than extension of my construct system. 
 
I gradually came round to the idea that the problem lay in my personal construal 
rather than my teaching skills, and of course in the process I began to learn 
about PCP and its view of personal change. Trevor stepped up his efforts to help 
me by bringing in some structured techniques: he talked me through a repertory 
grid, asked me to write a self-characterisation sketch and proposed that I act out 
a ‘fixed role’ we wrote together. These were very helpful in setting me firmly on 
the road to personal reconstrual. And the entire episode marked the beginning of 
my commitment to constructivism, an epistemological stance that has been the 
bedrock of my academic work for the last twenty years. So it was the capacity of 
constructivism to make sense of my problems that led me further into it as an 
academic. 
 
As I began to read more about PCP, one of the concepts that seemed to me 
particularly useful was that of metaphor. Kelly had suggested that construing can 
be thought of as behaving propositionally, ‘as-if’ the world were this or that kind 
of place and in the 1970s this had been elaborated by the construct theorist 
Miller-Mair (Mair, 1976), who wrote of our construing as a ‘passionate pretence’; 
we must never lose sight of the fact that our construal of the world is a 
wholehearted but temporary commitment to a metaphor- to treating novel events 
‘as if’ they were like something with which we are more familiar in order to get a 
grasp on them. In principle, this idea is similar to Moscovici’s concept of 
‘anchoring’, which is part of his theory of Social Representations. 
 
As it turned out, this was the beginning of a personal journey in constructivism 
and social constructionism that has continued throughout my academic career. I 
can trace it back to the realisation that I had come across something along the 
lines of what I had been reading about roles, pretence and metaphor when I was 
a PhD student back in the 1970s.  My PhD was actually on a very different kind 
of topic- individual differences in susceptibility to hypnosis.  Many psychologists 
will have heard of the venerable Ted Sarbin, who died only recently in 2005, but 
fewer may know that in the 1960s he had published a number of papers on 
hypnosis, and so he was a fairly prominent figure on my academic map. I 
remembered that, as part of my researches, I had read several publications by 
him in which he, unusually, advocated role theory as a framework for 
understanding the behaviour of the hypnotic subject (eg Sarbin, 1954). 
 
I recalled that Sarbin (Sarbin, 1976) had also proposed, drawing on the ideas of 
his Berkeley colleague philosopher Stephen C. Pepper, that what he referred to 
as the ‘root metaphor’ for psychology should not be ‘mechanism’ (a psychology 
of causes) but ‘contextualism’. In taking contextualism as our root metaphor for 
psychology, Sarbin argued, human behaviour would be understood in terms of 
the context that makes the behaviour meaningful to the actor, the narrative form 
with which we connect events together to make a meaningful account. Sarbin 
continued to develop this theme over the next 30 years- his now classic paper 
“The narrative as root metaphor for psychology” was published in his 1986 edited 
collection “Narrative Psychology: The storied nature of human conduct” and he is 
now seen as one of the founding fathers of the burgeoning field of  ‘narrative 
psychology’. As I rediscovered Sarbin’s earlier work through my new-found 
constructivist lenses I began to follow him through his emerging writings on 
narrative during my early years as a lecturer. 
 
What was exciting to me was that these constructivist ideas were being applied 
not just to the individual person but to the entire project of psychology and of 
science itself and to those cultures and societies that were principally engaged in 
the processes of constructing the scientific disciplines. The fundamental idea of 
PCP (expressed as Kelly’s fundamental postulate)- constructive alternativism- 
now seemed a possible framework for understanding not just the ideas and 
behaviour of individual persons but of whole societies. Sarbin’s now classic 
edited collection contained a contribution by Ken and Mary Gergen (Gergen and 
Gergen, 1986), and I found that Ken Gergen, like Sarbin, had proposed a 
contextualist, historical metaphor for psychology back in 1973 in a paper entitled 
‘Social Psychology as History’ where he argued that, as psychologists, our 
theories of social behavior are primarily reflections of contemporary history rather 
than objective formulations.  
 
From these discoveries, it was not long before I came across Gergen’s now 
classic 1985 paper “The social constructionist movement in modern psychology” 
and over the next several years I enthusiastically studied this emerging field, 
struggling with such beasts as poststructuralism, postmodernism and discourse 
analysis, eventually writing my own book “An introduction to Social 
Constructionism” which was published in 1995. There was of course no mention 
of PCP in any of the material I had encountered. Apart from Gergen’s classic 
contribution, social constructionism appeared to be a profoundly European 
movement and seemed to owe more to the thinking of French philosophers such 
as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida than to George Kelly and his followers. 
 
Nevertheless, the similarities between the fundamental concepts of PCP and 
social constructionist ideas seemed to me to be considerable, and I was 
eager to combine them in my own thinking. Other PCP scholars such as Mike 
Mahoney, Jim Mancuso, Jon Raskin and Dusan Stojnov  have over the years 
notably, have also pointed out the similarity between PCP and social 
constructionism in many of their theoretical assumptions (Mahoney, 1988; 
Mancuso, 1995; Raskin, 2002; Stojnov and Butt, 2002) and have been keen 
to develop PCP along constructionist lines. I spoke about these similarities as 
I saw them at the EPCA conference in York in 1992, where, as ever, my 
presentation was sympathetically received and the paper was subsequently 
published in Alan Thompson & Peter Cummins’ edited collection. It is no 
accident in my view that the PCP fraternity is one generally tolerant of new 
constructions in the form of speculative ideas. 
 
These similarities between PCP and the emerging perspective of social 
constructionism I felt could be summed up as follows: 
 
1. Firstly, both deny there is anything fundamental about what we regard as 
human nature- there are an infinite number of ways of construing events, 
of attaching meaning to them. Nothing in our social world, including 
people, comes bearing labels. The person is a created, constructed 
phenomenon. In this respect, PCP stands in stark contrast to much of 
mainstream psychology. Trait theorists, psychodynamic theorists and 
humanistic psychologists may disagree about the essential nature of 
human beings- yet importantly they all propose that there IS an essential 
nature to humans, and that, in varying degrees, the hand we are 
personally dealt in life’s card game determines our psychological 
character. Indeed, in western societies I believe we are becoming 
increasingly enchanted by a reductionist biological determinism- we seem 
to delight in reports that, for example, we may have discovered the gene 
for homosexuality, alcoholism or criminality. Neither PCP nor social 
constructionism would have any truck with such ideas. Behaviourism is 
perhaps alone in the mainstream psychological world in offering a view of 
the person as having no essential nature. 
 
 
2. Secondly, both offer a stark contrast to traditional psychologies, in 
highlighting the nature of these theories of human nature as constructions. 
They both argue that alternative accounts of the person should have no 
particular claim to the label of fact or truth- although some may be more 
useful than others. Whereas trait theory, psychodynamic theory and 
evolutionary psychology do not question their own claims to truth, George 
Kelly significantly proposed that his theory of Personal Constructs should 
be adopted until a better construction of the person came along. And here 
‘better’ means more useful, not more accurate or truthful. Likewise, social 
constructionism is radically skeptical of truth claims, especially where 
these relate to the nature of people in general or to individuals. 
 
3.  And thirdly, both focus upon accounts, upon the narratives through which 
people live out their lives, the representations of themselves and their 
world that they offer each other. 
 
Despite these important similarities, it began to occur to me that there was 
something important missing from social constructionist accounts- the person as 
a psychological being.  It seemed to me that social constructionism entailed an 
almost complete absence of a psychological being from its understanding of 
social life- the person, theoretically speaking, had almost ceased to exist here. At 
that time, the very different social constructionist work of people who today we 
might refer to as Discursive Psychologists or Critical Psychologists or Discourse 
Analysts and so on was not so differentiated. Nevertheless, in various ways 
social constructionist theory and research seemed to either ignore or even deny 
the psychological being that had been the centre of attention since psychology 
emerged as a discipline. For example, the work of those who today go by the 
name of Discursive Psychologists focused only on the nature and workings of the 
accounts that are built by people in interactions of various kinds. The person 
building those accounts was ‘bracketed off’ and not subject to enquiry. This 
seemed to me a disingenuous stance. The person was ‘emptied’ of psychological 
content such as attitudes, beliefs, motivations and so on- these things were 
social constructions and not (as the behaviourists would agree) motivators of 
behaviour. Nevertheless, discursive psychologists inevitably on occasions 
needed to refer to the person producing accounts and could not help but make 
attributions about their motivations for building an account in a particular way. It 
seemed to me that the person as a psychological being was always implicit in 
such discursive work. 
 
Those social constructionists who preferred to take their lead from Foucault 
focused on the constructive power of widespread social discourses. Within this 
form of social constructionism, the coherence and unity of the self with which we 
in the western world are familiar is replaced by fragmentation. The person’s  
identity and subjectivity  is seen as constantly shifting as it is produced through 
the various discourses, social practices and relationships in which the person is 
caught up from moment to moment. This very notion of the self is seen as a 
social construction, and our experience of being a person, our identity, is 
explained not as arising from any essential states or processes, but as 
constructed in and derived from the wider cultural and linguistic realm in which 
we all move. The self here is not a way of accounting for social phenomena, but 
an outcome of them. In its extreme form, the person appears only as a vehicle 
through which discourses may manifest themselves. It seemed to me 
dismayingly determinist, replacing the biological and psychological determinism 
of mainstream psychology with a social determinism that was certainly different, 
but no better. 
 
As a psychologist, I felt strongly that there was a place for a theory of the person 
in social constructionism. Of course, this theory of the person would need to be 
radically different from what mainstream psychologists had been used to- a being 
perhaps filled with measurable quantities of various traits or driven by 
unconscious forces beyond their own understanding. But a person without the 
ability for reflection on their experience and without the power to make choices 
between alternatives they perceived to be available to them would indeed be 
nothing more than a vehicle for the manifestation of discourses. So it seemed 
important to me to adopt a model of the person consistent with social 
constructionism that, while rejecting the essentialism so contested by 
constructionists, would retain the important concepts of meaningful action and 
choice.  
 
PCP, that most constructivist of psychologies, would surely be able to make a 
contribution to understanding the person in a socially constructed world. So, 
Trevor and I set about writing a paper outlining how PCP might complement 
social constructionism.  But our attempts to publish this proved unsuccessful 
(Burr and Butt, 1993). And in fact when we presented these ideas to 
constructionist-minded social psychologists at conferences they were not well 
received. Our attempt to put back a meaning-making, agentic individual into the 
social constructonist framework was largely seen as a misguided, perhaps even 
sentimental, slide back into the liberal humanism from which social 
constructionists were so eager to distance themselves. And so constructivism 
and constructionism, these two terms that we encounter in academic writing and 
that sound so similar, have different meanings, with the term ‘constructivism’ 
referring to theoretical perspectives (including PCP) where the emphasis is on 
the constructive agency of the person in creating their phenomenal world, and 
the very similar term ‘constructionism’ (or social constructionism) being used to 
refer to perspectives emphasising the constructive power of social forces and 
language to shape our personhood. The gap between these seemed 
unbridgeable, with constructivist theories seen as uncritically accepting the 
agentic self underlying behaviour and constructionist theories regarding this self 
as no more than a discursive, even ideological, construction.  
 
Given that social constructionist ideas have generally come from outside the 
discipline of psychology, it is unsurprising that the nature of personhood has not 
been at the centre of debate. This was simply not the question that it primarily set 
out to address. And I feel that social constructionism has been and continues to 
be an enormously valuable critical voice in psychology, challenging psychology’s 
taken-for-granted assumptions. But at that time it was not ready to take seriously 
any attempt to theorise the individual person. However it seemed to me that, 
challenging though it would be, it should in principle be possible to build a model 
of the self and of human personhood that did not involve an uncritical slide back 
into the essentialism and liberal humanism so rejected by constructionists, and I 
felt (and still feel) that this is an important goal for psychologists to aim towards. 
 
The personal construct community appeared to be more open to alternative 
constructions, and, with the welcome collaboration of Richard Bell, Trevor and I 
subsequently undertook, and later published, a small empirical study using a 
repertory grid to explore people’s experience of selfhood in terms of 
fragmentation and unity (Burr et al, 1997). We asked people to construe 
themselves in a number of different relationships with others and found that 
people did indeed find very different experiences of self in different relationships. 
This plurality in our experience of ourselves is something that Miller-Mair (Mair, 
1977) has described in his idea of the ‘community of self’ and it is what 
constructionists mean by fragmentation. However all of our participants, almost 
paradoxically, made use of a construct that could be described as: ‘can be myself 
vs put on an act’. They retained a sense of self that seemed to transcend that 
fragmentation and that was important to them. This self is more of a social, 
interpersonal construction rather than the individual, personal invention than PCP 
might suggest, with a plurality of selves produced in joint actions with others.  Yet 
there is still a personal constructor in this social process. People can ‘recognise’ 
themselves in some encounters (which we may characterise as roles or 
discursive positions) and not others, and this testifies to a ‘sense of self’.  
 
This is a constructed self-theory rather than the essentialist self of traditional 
psychology, but nevertheless it provides an important platform from which the 
person can act. Together with Franz Epting, Trevor and I later wrote about this in 
terms of the notion of ‘core construing’ (1998), suggesting that this might be 
better conceptualized as a ‘core process’, a process of building and living out a 
narrative of ourselves- a story of our lives if you like- that we are responsible for 
but which is to some degree inevitably told and experienced in terms dictated by 
the social and cultural world in which we move. So the self here is both a 
personal and a social construction, needing both constructivist and 
constructionist theories to properly understand it. Other PCP scholars, such as 
Bob and Greg Neimeyer and Luis Botella, have likewise been keen to see PCP 
as an important member of a family of constructivist theories, reflecting  
postmodern trends in the construction of social reality (Neimeyer & Neimeyer, 
1993a; Botella, 1995). 
 Meanwhile, in the social constructionist world, some writers had begun to raise 
concerns about how social constructionism dealt with (or rather didn’t deal with) 
subjectivity and experience. Carla Willig, whose work I greatly respect, was one 
of the first to point to this as a deficiency in social constructionist accounts of the 
person, and the strand of constructionism that draws on Foucault has now 
embraced subjectivity as an important focus of research, and aims to cast light 
on the way in which prevailing discourses inform our personal experience and 
sense of self. This is something that has a parallel life in PCP through the 
concepts of commonality and sociality, in the idea that people who share a 
common culture will inevitably make sense of their experience through a similar 
set of constructs. For example, Harry Procter has used the notion of ‘family 
constructs’ when working with families in difficulty. 
 
Nevertheless, understanding individual differences- which PCP does so well- is 
not a central concern for social constructionists. Different people positioned 
within the same discourses of, say, gender or age, do not necessarily engage 
with these or live them out in the same way. For psychologists (rather than 
sociologists or social theorists, for example) individual human experience and 
conduct should be an important concern. Social constructionism provides a vital 
challenge to psychology’s essentialism and ahistoricism and it has given us a 
way of understanding being a person that draws attention to the powerful cultural 
and linguistic realm within which we all move. But I think it often falls short of 
giving us a grasp on the experience of individual persons at a sufficiently micro 
level to be of use to them. 
 
Looking back now at what Trevor and I wrote sixteen years ago, I am surprised 
at how much I would still defend today. Many Personal Construct theorists have 
embraced the postmodern constructionist turn in psychology and there still 
seems to me no theoretical reason why PCP should not be used to elaborate the 
model of the person suggested by social constructionism, especially where 
personal experience and change are the focus of interest. Much less likely 
candidates, such as psychodynamic theory, have, surprisingly, been drawn on by 
social constructionists in the past. In reality, the barriers may have more to do 
with misperceptions of PCP (and it is often poorly misunderstood by mainstream 
psychologists) and a lingering knee-jerk prejudice against its North American 
optimism and belief in personal agency. And there is much in PCP that would be 
of value to the social constructionist in research and practice, from the simple 
use of propositional or invitational thinking to the whole range of innovative 
methods that PCP scholars and practitioners have developed. 
 
I must leave my narrative there- the problem that I have been talking about is one 
that, from where I stand in psychology, may not exercise others who have 
different, perhaps more practical, concerns. And finding a way to foreground PCP 
in a constructionist psychology is not straightforward. With the benefit of time, 
experience and hindsight, I now feel this probably has less to do with resolving 
theoretical tensions on paper and more to do with introducing PCP to key people, 
and to disseminating its practical uses in constructionist circles. At the coal-face 
of research and practice, theoretical tensions are often forgotten amid the need 
to find a way of doing things that work for one’s purposes- almost a definition of a 
construct! Perhaps, as that grand old master of social psychology Serge 
Moscovici revealed, if you shout loud enough and long enough, eventually 
people will listen! 
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